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Abstract 
In this paper we use the Continuous Sample of Working Histories 2005 (MCVL2005) to 
analyze the earnings assimilation of migrants from outside the EU-15 in Spain. Using our 
panel dataset we show that immigrants reduce around the half of the initial wage gap 
respect to natives the first 5 to 6 years after arrival. However, no further reductions of the 
remaining wage gap are estimated. We also show that results based on cross-section data 
are downward biased since an important increase in the quality of migrants has taken place 
over the recent years. This skill upgrading of new immigrant cohorts is evident in the Spanish 
case as well as the depreciation of the value of most of the experience that is brought from 
abroad. We can associate the improvement in the skill of immigrants to a change in the 
composition of new entrants. An important mechanism underlying the assimilation is the 
higher likelihood of recent immigrants in changing jobs among different sectors and firms, 
but also improving their situation within the same firm. Finally, some caveats should be taken 
into account when interpreting our results given that immigration phenomenon is quite recent 
in the Spanish labour market and it has taken place in an especially positive economic 
environment. 
 
Keywords: Immigration, assimilation, longitudinal data, selection, human capital. 
Clasificación JEL: J31, J61. 
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1 Introduction 
Assimilation of immigrants in the host country is a broad concept. Some people emphasize 
the fact that immigrants adopt the values, culture and traditions with the underlying idea of 
keeping a cohesive society. However, that concept of assimilation is certainly difficult to 
measure. A much easier concept to quantify is assimilation in earnings. It has been proven 
that immigrants have a negative wage gap respect to observationally equivalent natives. This 
gap partly reflects the fact that migrants cannot use all the human capital they have acquired 
in their country of origin. In that case, a typical human capital model [Sjaastad (1962), Ben 
Porath (1967)] would predict a large incentive to invest in human capital upon arrival which will 
consequently generate a steeper wage earnings profile along the migrants’ life cycle 
compared to otherwise identical native workers. One of the most important investments once 
in a new country is the language, but there are other issues to be learnt, from particular 
regulations to country-specific skills. Moreover, in a regulated labour market such as the 
Spanish one, there are many institutions that can contribute to non-market clearing wage 
differentials across regions or sectors [Izquierdo and Lacuesta (2005)]. Migrants are more 
prone to benefit from those differences since they have lower social attachments than natives. 
Therefore, the initial wage gap between migrants and non-migrants might disappear as long 
as migrants reallocate themselves into jobs that offer better economic opportunities. 
The literature on assimilation of wage earnings starts with Chiswick (1978) who found 
an assimilation rate of 2% per year in the United States. This means that an initial wage gap of 
30% is completely vanished after 15 years of residence. However, the robustness of his 
empirical results was criticized because of the usage of a single cross section since with 
this type of data migrants with different labour market experience in the destination country 
belonged to different entry cohorts. If there is a decrease in the quality of migrants that 
entered the country over time, as it happened in the United States [Borjas (1999)], the wage 
growth estimated is an upward biased measure of the real one. On the other hand, 
if there is an improvement in the quality of immigrants, the actual wage growth would be 
underestimated.  This problem was traditionally solved by using repeated cross sections 
and following the history of different individuals belonging to the same entry cohort 
[LaLonde and Topel (1992)]. 
Even in the case that the quality of migrants does not change over different entry 
cohorts, we might get biased estimations of the actual assimilation derived from selective 
emigration. Let’s assume that migrants who decide to go back home after a while are those 
who perform the worse. In that case, following the wage growth of a particular entry cohort 
gets an upward biased estimation of the actual wage growth because those foreigners 
that have stayed longer are better than the average foreigner at the moment of entry. 
We might partly solve this problem by using longitudinal data as in Wei-Yin Hu (2000) and 
Lubotsky (2007). Longitudinal data tracks the wage growth of individuals who belonged to 
a particular entry cohort and stayed for a certain number of years in the country. In a sense, 
with longitudinal data we empirically estimate the assimilation profile of that selective group of 
foreigners1. 
                                                                          
1. Notice that this is not an estimation of the assimilation profile of all foreigners who entered in a particular year. In order 
to extrapolate the abovementioned results we would require more assumptions. For example, assuming that differences 
between migrants who succeed and fail are wage level instead of wage growth differences. 
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Following the spirit of those papers, we carry-out the first analysis of the earnings 
assimilation profile of immigrants in Spain using a longitudinal dataset (Continuous Sample of 
Working Histories 2005). The Spanish case is particularly interesting to analyze. By one 
hand, immigration phenomena has been especially intense over the last decade, since the 
annual inflow of immigrants, on average more than 500.000 since 2000, pushed up 
the percentage of immigrants in the Spanish population from 2% in 2000 to 11% six years 
later. Over this period, immigration accounted for more than 80% of the total growth in the 
working age population and almost 50% of the growth in employment. This immigration 
shock took place in an especially good economic context, GDP growth was quite robust 
(3.6% on average for the period 2000-2006) and unemployment decreased dramatically. 
In the other hand, the wage assimilation process in a regulated labour market, like the 
Spanish one, may be quite different than the one observed in more flexible labour markets 
(US, for example). Labour market institutions, such as the collective bargaining mechanism or 
employment protection, which configure a quite rigid labour market may play a relevant role. 
Indeed, in this particular context we might expect a relatively low level of earnings assimilation 
of immigrants according to other international findings. Antecol et al. (2006) found a relatively 
low level of earnings assimilation in Australia compared to the United States and Canada and 
high employment rate assimilation. 
In addition, empirical evidence about the behaviour of immigrants in the Spanish 
labour market is relatively scarce. We know, for instance, that immigrants do not perform very 
well respect to natives. For instance, Adsera and Chiswick (2007) and Amuedo-Dorantes and 
de la Rica (2007a) show that immigrants coming from outside the EU-15 tend to earn 30% 
less than natives and face a higher unemployment rate (12.3 respect to 7% among natives 
in 2007). With respect to assimilation, Amuedo Dorantes and De la Rica (2007a) used a single 
cross section for 2002 and taking some assumptions due to their data limitations, found that 
immigrants decreased the wage gap in 15 pp during the first 5 years of residence in Spain. 
Fernández and Ortega (2006) used the Labour Force Survey data to analyze assimilation 
in working conditions. Their results failed to find an improvement in their labour conditions, 
especially in terms of stability in the job. 
On the impact of immigration on the functioning of the Spanish labour market, 
several studies have tried to analyze the impact of the immigration shock on the labour 
market performance of native workers, mainly in terms of employment. Carrasco et al. (2008) 
or Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2007b) tend to find very mild effects on native 
employment opportunities. With respect to the evolution of productivity, the negative wage 
gap is associated with a productivity gap and thus, immigration has been called to explain, 
at least partially, the poor performance of labour productivity over the most recent period 
[see Banco de España (2006) and Lacuesta et al. (2008)]. On this topic, the analysis of 
immigrants assimilation will give us some valuable information about the likelihood of a 
productivity recovery over the near future since if, as in other countries, we observe 
an assimilation process of immigrants in Spain associated with the acquirement of 
country-specific skills, this will have a positive impact on productivity evolution over the 
next years. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section briefly describes the 
database we use for the analysis and in the third section we explain the empirical specification 
of wage equations used to estimate the assimilation process. Fourth section includes main 
results of the paper about the estimation of these equations while in the fifth section we 
provide some additional information about the relevance in Spain of changes in the quality 
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of different cohorts of immigrants. In the sixth section we try to provide some explanation of 
the mechanisms that could be behind the process of earning assimilation and, finally, 
section 7 concludes. 
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2 Data 
The data we use comes from the 2005 wave of Continuous Sample of Working Histories 
(“Muestra continua de Vidas Laborales”). This dataset is formed by a 4% random sample of 
all individuals who have had an affiliation in the Social Security during the current year.2 
The dataset gives historical information of all relationships within the Social Security System 
(in terms of employment, unemployment benefits and other contributed pensions perceived) 
with information about job characteristics such as type of contract, length, sector of activity, 
working time, and monthly capped earnings joint with some personal information about 
the worker (sex, age and nationality). The matching of this dataset with data from the 
Municipal Register of Inhabitants (Padrón Municipal de Habitantes) adds information on 
education, place of birth, place of residence and some characteristics of the household. 
This dataset provides a representative sample of the Spanish labour market. If we 
compare aggregate figures with Labour Force survey, which is the main source for 
employment figures in Spain, we basically observe that our dataset offers an appropriate 
picture of the formal sector of the Spanish labour market In particular, figures coming from 
MCVL2005 tend to estimate a slightly lower employment level across different 
age/sex/nationality breakdowns that we could explain by the relevance of the informal sector 
in the Spanish economy3. This is shown in Ramos Muñoz (2007) where a detailed 
comparison is carried-out. This study identified most of the differences between the two data 
sets for youth, females and foreigners. They attribute those differences, as it was mentioned 
before, to the informal sector. They also analyzed differences in professional status (employee 
or self-employed), type of contract (temporary versus permanent) and length of the working 
day; obtaining very similar distributions in both samples. Thus, although we are quite 
confident about the representativeness of our sample to study the Spanish labour market 
when we interpret our results we should be aware that we are estimating the assimilation of 
legal migrants working in the formal sector of the economy. Finally, it is important to note that 
the information is only representative of the social security records in the current year. 
Workers in 2005 are a random sample of workers affiliated to the Social Security in 2005, 
however; for previous years we only observe the historical relationships for those 
individuals who either work or earn unemployment benefits in 2005. Therefore, workers in 
years before 2005 are not a representative sample of workers in that particular year because 
of non-random exit form the labour market4. For the purpose of this study, this feature is 
going to be valuable as it will be noted in the next section. 
With respect to the characteristics or our sample, we restrict the sample to males 
between 25 and 54 years old in order to have the analysis free of selection on the labour 
market. At those ages, almost all natives and immigrant males are active and this is important 
since we do not model a participation decision in our framework. We perform the analysis 
using two different measures of daily wages. Firstly, daily wages are computed as the ratio 
                                                                          
2. Indeed, we use information from the simple 2005B that has information on the Social Security records and 
the Population registers (Padrón) but it does not have any information on fiscal registers. The sample has 1.142.118 
individuals. 
3. There are some workers from the Public Sector that do not need to be registered in the Social Security and 
they are registered in what is called clases pasivas o MUFACE. Nowadays the amount that those workers represent 
is very small. 
4. In the future, it is expected to follow up the cohorts adding some information to keep the representativeness of 
the sample in each particular year. 
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between monthly earnings and the days worked in a particular month. Since the data on 
Social Security contributions is given monthly, this is the more sensible way to proceed. 
However, since migrants are expected to rotate between employment and unemployment 
much more than natives, we might be capturing a self selected sample of immigrants 
(only those who are employed in a particular month). Moreover, we identify some individuals 
whose firms do contribute to the social security with a certain delay5. In order to solve 
those problems we check the robustness of the results computing daily earnings as the ratio 
between the sum of the current year earnings and the days worked during the year. 
Since there is no earnings information before 1979 we keep individuals who start 
their labour career after that date. Moreover, we keep track of earnings only in the case of 
being employed in the Social Security General Regime. We do not take into account earnings 
obtained as self-employed since they might have more freedom to choose their reported 
contribution bases and, given this fact, the wage might be a downward proxy of the real 
earnings. We also drop unemployment insurance earnings. Sometimes, the administrative 
records report a zero or negative earnings while the person has a contract. Most of the time, 
this fact means a delay in the payment of social security contributions or adjustments of the 
administration. The measure of wages using annual earnings should be free of this problem. 
Many individuals have different contracts during a month, therefore we add up all earnings for 
an individual in that month. If the total earnings, once all contracts are added up, exceed the 
corresponding cap per year and group of contribution, we substitute that number for the cap. 
In order to compute the days worked during a month or a year we consider all contracts in a 
particular month/year for each individual. 
Regarding the definition of a migrant, we use nationality instead of the country of 
origin to define an individual as a migrant. This is coherent with definitions used in other 
studies and country of origin is not available for the whole sample of individuals. However, this 
definition has a potential shortcoming give that a migrant who entered in Spain in the 1980s 
but got Spanish nationality is observed as a Spanish worker in our sample6. Notwithstanding, 
we think this is not very relevant7, at least for the migrants arrived in the last decade since 
they still have not had enough time to get Spanish nationality. Finally, we restrict the sample 
of migrants in the empirical exercise to be not members of the EU-15 since immigration from 
those countries has been traditionally very different to the immigration coming from the rest 
of the world (with a high share of retirees). 
Experience in the Spanish labour market is computed sequentially from the moment 
the worker enters the sample. If the person entered for the first time the job market 
in February 1980 we keep that particular monthly earning as his initial earning. The earnings 
on February 1981 represent the earnings after 1 year of experience and so on8.  If the person 
did not work at all in one particular month, he will have a missing value in earnings (or out of 
the labour force). However, that year counts for the experience profile of the person. Indeed, 
if the individual comes back to work 5 years after, he is considered to have 5 years more of 
                                                                          
5. We treat those as missing values in the monthly payments. 
6. We cannot observe those who have double nationatility from the beginning. They will be treated as Spaniards in our 
sample. According to the labour force survey in the fourth quarter of 2008 there were 88.000 males between 
25 and 54 years old represent the 0.8% of the population. 
7. Results do not change by using place of birth on the sample we have availability of this variable. 
8. The same reasoning is applied for the second measure of daily wages using current years, but at this point all 
earnings in a current year should be added up. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0904 
experience. Therefore, experience should be considered as years after the first entry in the 
labour market9. 
Many migrants entered Spain with some experience from abroad. However, we do 
not have information on that issue. This ingredient is crucial in order to compare the wage 
experience profile of migrants and non-migrants since otherwise, at the moment of entry, 
we are comparing people at different stages of their working careers. In order to have 
information on experience abroad we estimate potential experience abroad substracting 
potential age of entry in the labour market in the origin country to the age of entry 
in Spain. Potential age of entry in the origin country is 16 if the person has lower education 
than a university degree and 22 if the person received a university degree. On the other 
hand the age of entry in Spain is the age of the person at the moment of the first contribution 
in the social security. One evident problem with this estimation of potential experience is 
that our measure of education comes from Padrón and as it was commented above it does 
not appropriately depict actual education, and is not available for every one10. Many people 
present a lower education in the Padrón compared to their real level. This is the case because 
the administrative data is not updated unless someone changes residence into a different 
municipality. This problem should be smaller for immigrants since most of them arrive in 
Spain to work. Even in that case, people might decide not to update the information, since 
could be inconvenient11. However, we are going to assume that answers of foreigners 
are correct in average. 
An additional problem is that the age of entry does not necessarily depict the real 
age of entry into Spain, since many migrants, as it will be shown later, enter illegally into 
the country or work in the informal sector even being legal. Lubotsky (2007), who have 
alternative measures for the age of entry, showed that different measures affect slightly 
the quantitative results without affecting them qualitatively. Since we do not have alternative 
measures we need to stick to the abovementioned concept of year of entry. On this regard, 
the existence of several regularization processes in Spain is problematic. For an illegal 
migrant that is legalized, years since migration is an upward biased measure of the real years 
spent in Spain and the number of years abroad is a downward measure of the experience 
in the home country. Table 1 shows the processes of regularization in the recent past [OECD 
(2007)]. In order to analyze whether our results are affected by those regularizations, we 
repeat all the analysis dropping from our sample all individuals who report to have had their 
first labour experience in those particular years. 
                                                                          
9. Since the study is restricted to males between 25 and 54 years old we do not think that exit and re-entry is an 
important issue. 
10. We consider as low educated those who do not report education. 
11. Being elected as a member of a public jury depends on the educational attainment. 
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Table 1. Regularization processes in the Spanish Economy 
Year Number regularized 
Primary policy 
target Benefit granted Conditions 
1985-1986 38,181 All foreigners Residence and work 
permit 
Applied to unauthorized workers 
and residents. 
1991 110,100 Workers Residence and work 
permit 
Illegal aliens working in Spain 
since May 15, 1991, rejected 
asylum seekers or those 
with asylum request pending. 
1996 21,300 All foreigners (13,800 
work permits and 
7,500 residence) 
One year residence and 
work permit 
Applied to those residing in Spain 
since January 1, 1996. 
2000 163,900 All foreigners One year residence and 
work permit 
Applied to those who had 
previously held or applied for 
either work of residence permits 
in the three years prior to 2000, 
or had filed an asylum application 
before 2000. 
2001 216,400 Workers One year residence and 
work permit 
Applied to those who could prove 
employment as well as social ties 
in Spain. 
2005 548,700 All foreigners Six months residence 
and work permit 
Applied to those who have an 
employment offer lasting for 6 
months. 
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3 Empirical strategy 
Let’s start with a model for natives and immigrants wages. Spanish worker enter into the 
labour market with some specific skills, depending on their gender, education and birth 
cohort. From that moment on, the wage is increased by a function        due to a process of 
on the job learning. Macroeconomic shocks tµ and an idiosyncratic shock itε affect 
someone’s wage. Given these ingredients, the wage profile of individual i across time (t) is 
defined as: 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, immigrants arrive to the country with certain labour market 
experience in addition to their initial particular skills. The experience acquired abroad has 
certain value in the Spanish labour market say      . And once in the country, immigrants start 
to increase their human capital at a rate       . Given that the individual enters at the age of ta, 
the wage is given by: 
 
 
 
Earnings assimilation is the process by which two individuals with the same years of 
labour market experience in their lives differ in their wage growth, in such a way the one 
with the initial lowest wage approaches the one with the highest. Mathematically, assuming 
that immigrants have the lowest wage we would require that: 
 
 
 
Let’s define an indicator of migrant status I. Pooling (1) and (2), we can specify 
a model for the pool of workers in this economy as: 
 
 
As it has been suggested in the literature there are some problems associated to the 
estimation of equation (3) using a single cross-section. In this type of databases, migrants 
with different years of labour market experience have entered in Spain at different points in 
time. Therefore, it is impossible to distinguish the wage growth associated with labour market 
experience from that wage growth associated with changes in the entry cohort quality. 
Provided, for instance, that there was a decrease in the quality of migrants that enter the 
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country over time, as it happened in the United States [Borjas (1999)], the wage growth over 
the life cycle in the cross section is an upward biased measure of the actual average wage 
growth. On the other hand, if there was an improvement in the quality of immigrants, the 
actual wage growth would be underestimated. This problem has been traditionally solved by 
using several cross sections allowing us to follow the history of different individuals belonging 
to the same entry cohort. 
Even in the case that the quality of migrants was the same over year of entry, 
we might face an additional estimation problem derived from selective emigration. Let’s 
assume that migrants who decide to go back home after a while are those who perform the 
worse. In that case the actual wage growth would also be over-estimated in the cross section 
because those who present higher levels of experience are the best migrants of their cohort 
of entry. The opposite is true if those migrants who go back home have performed better. 
This shortcoming cannot be solved by using repeated cross sections. 
In order to see both problems mathematically, assume that wage growth for natives 
and immigrants is constant over time and immigrants arrive in Spain without any experience 
from abroad: 
 
 
Notice that the way migrants assimilate with respect to natives is fully estimated by 
comparing two immigrants with the same characteristics (X) except for the years since 
migration: 
 [ ] [ ] ( )NIt,it,i smye_migyears_sinc,X|WlnEysme_migyears_sinc,X|WlnE δδ −==−= 0  
 
In a 2005 cross section, we might for example measure the degree of assimilation 
after five years of residence in Spain. In that case, we can only compare wages of recent 
migrants and migrants who arrived five years in advance: 
 [ ] ( )
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With a single cross section we are not able to distinguish the part of the increase in 
earnings due to acquisition of experience and human capital as time goes on ( )NI5 δδ − – the 
true measure of assimilation –, and the part due to differences in quality of the different entry 
cohorts. Decreasing the quality of the cohort of entry biases upward the assimilation profile 
and vice versa. This possible bias in measuring the size of assimilation on earnings using a 
single cross section is exacerbated under the presence of selective emigration. Indeed, not all 
migrants from a particular entry cohort remain in the country for five years. Some might have 
been unable to pursue their plans, or some might have entered with the idea of a temporary 
migration. Again, if better immigrants stay longer, assimilation is overestimated. 
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Using repeated cross sections we solve the first problem but not the second one 
since we compare the same entry cohort at different moments of time12: 
 [ ] ( )
[ ] )arrived just,entry(Wlnarrived just,entry|WlnE
 I5 )years 5  stayer,entry(Wlnyears 5  stayer,entry|WlnE
i,i
i
NI
i,i
20002000
20002000
0
2000
0
2005
===
−+=== δδ
 
 
However, using longitudinal data, we observe information on wages in a 
retrospective way for every individual who enter in a particular year and have stayed in the 
country until 2005, what allows overcoming both problems: 
 
  
 Of course, if both the initial wage level and the wage growth once in the country is 
different for individuals who succeed and individuals who failed, the panel cannot solve 
completely the problem. In that case, longitudinal data only identifies the assimilation 
profile of stayers. In next sections we analyze the assimilation profile of different entry cohorts. 
Recent entry cohorts did not have much time to be selected, whereas previous entry cohorts 
should be much more selected. If we do not observe many differences in the assimilation 
profile between the different entry cohorts, we should be more prone to accept the 
assumption that assimilation is similar for stayers and temporary workers. 
In any case, longitudinal data is not absent of problems since it is impossible to 
discriminate between experience, birth cohort and time effects [Deaton and Paxson (1994)]. 
In the case of United States, Lubotsky (2007) added a time dummy without considering 
variations in the cohort effects of natives. In the case of Spain this could generate important 
shortcomings since there has been an important upgrade in real salaries over Spanish entry 
cohorts in our data set, due, mainly, to the observed increase in the average educational 
attainment. There are several ways of identifying cohort effects from time dummies 
[see Deaton and Paxson (1994) or Kapteyn et al. (2003)]. We follow the strategy of 
Beaudry and Lemieux (1999) identifying time effects with the structural unemployment rate, 
or NAIRU, and birth cohorts with different dummies for the age of entry. The NAIRU is 
computed using a BP filter on the original unemployment series. 
 
                                                                          
12. We are assuming there are not time effects. 
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4 Empirical results for earnings assimilation 
Let’s start by showing some raw data that will be helpful in order to understand the 
ingredients of our wage regression. Figure 1 shows median real earnings per day for native 
males. Analyzing the initial wage per cohort of entry, there has been a certain upgrade in real 
earnings over entry cohorts for nationals. 
 
Figure 1: Earnings per day (Median).National males per year of entry in SS
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Part of this increase could be attributed to the educational upgrading in the labour 
force over the last decades. Indeed, those individuals who enter the labour market 
in 2001-2005 are more educated than those entering in 1978-1982. Moreover, it is possible 
that the quality of education has also changed over time. That is the reason why we add 
dummies according to the date of birth in the wage regressions. 
Regarding immigrants, figure 2 shows the daily wage experience profile for non 
EU-15 migrants. The initial level is slightly lower than that of natives, especially for early entry 
cohorts. However, in this figure, it is much more clear the increase in initial wages per cohort 
of entry. This upgrading might be picking up an increasing demand for unskilled labour, 
however, if this was the case, figure 1 would also suffer the same movement at least for 
very young workers, and this is not the case. Therefore, there should be a notable upgrading 
of the quality of migrant cohorts. Indeed, in the recent years there has been a shift in the 
country of origin flows of non-EU-15 migrants, increasing the amount of foreigners coming 
from South America and the countries of the European enlargement as opposed to Africans. 
Those first two groups used to have higher educational levels which generate higher wages. 
We will come back to this issue in section 6. 
According to this figure, the experience earnings profile of immigrants is flatter than 
the one for natives especially for those cohorts entering in recent years. However, this does 
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not mean that over time in Spain the wage gap between migrants and non-migrants 
increases. Indeed, total experience is the sum of experience abroad and after arrival, and the 
experience earnings profile is a combination of the valuation for both types of experience. 
For migrants who enter in the recent years, the slope of the curve is almost flat meaning that 
the experience abroad is less valued in Spain. Instead, the slope becomes steeper for those 
migrants who have been in Spain for a certain number of years. 
 
Figure 2: Earnings per day (Median).Migrant males by potential experience
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Total Experience (Years)
E
ur
os
  d
ay
1979-82 1983-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 2001-05
 
 
This could be also observed in figure 3, where we plot the evolution of daily earning 
for migrants as experience in Spain increases. Notice that the slope of recent cohorts 
become steeper while the slope for older cohorts remains more or less unchanged. 
The abovementioned preliminary evidence makes clear the importance of controlling the 
experience before migration and the cohort of entry for migrants. 
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Figure 3: Earnings per day (Median).Migrant males by year of entry in SS
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Therefore, if the upgrading of migrants by cohort of entry is confirmed, the results 
for the assimilation profile in the single cross section will be downward biased because of the 
increase in quality by migrant cohort. In this case we will need to use the longitudinal data 
set to solve the problem. So, we estimate equation (3) using the cross section and the 
longitudinal dataset in order to compare the results. Since the observed value of earnings 
is top-coded and the censored part is around 15%-20% in the whole sampling period we will 
use median regressions for the dependent variable, being               the salary cap13: 
 
 
As in Lubotsky (2007) we use Powell (1984) semi-parametric censored least absolute 
deviation. We compute the standard deviation with a sandwich estimator [Koenker and 
Basset (1978)]. 
In table 2 we show the results for the regression pooling natives and immigrants 
coming from countries outside the EU-15. In the first three columns of that table the 
analysis is done with daily wages measured as the ratio between monthly earnings and 
the days worked in a particular month. The following three columns show the same results 
using annual wages and the days worked in a particular year. Results are quite similar 
according to both definitions of daily earnings. The first column of each block shows the 
wage model estimated using only the information in 2005, as it would be in a cross section. 
The coefficients in front of the dummies of years since migration express the way the wage 
gap decreasing over time in Spain. The results do show some assimilation over the time of 
residence (the first 8 years of experience in Spain reduced the wage differential by 17%). 
On the contrary, after that date, assimilation decreases notably. 
                                                                          
13. There is also a lower bound for wages (minimum wage). The lower bound is a different problem than the upper 
bound since the minimum wage coincides with real earnings, whereas the upper bound is different to the real earnings 
of those in that group. On the other hand, even if we do not believe that minimum wages reflect their productivity, the 
median regression should not be affected by it. 
( )itit*it Wln,WlnminWln =
itWln
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However, these results are affected by both changes in the quality of the cohort of 
entry and selective emigration. Indeed, if there is an increase in the quality of immigrants in the 
recent years, as it was suggested by the previous figures, the conclusions of assimilation 
are downward biased. That is the reason why we need to use longitudinal data to estimate 
equation (3). The advantage of using the panel is that it allows the introduction of quality 
of entry cohort for migrants and birth cohort for natives. The second column of each block 
shows the corresponding results. Indeed, the importance of introducing these two 
variables is clear since in both cases there has been an upgrading of quality. Once we control 
for this fact, the results regarding assimilation change in a relevant way with respect to 
what was observed in the cross section. The coefficient in front of the dummy regarding 
the first two years of experience in Spain indicates that the initial wage gap decreases 8 pp 
after the first two years. The following two years the wage gap decreases 4 pp additionally 
(reducing the wage gap in 12 pp). Finally, those who have stayed in Spain for longer than 
8 years present a reduction in the initial wage gap of 20 pp. From that moment on, it does not 
appear to be further reductions. Differences with the cross-sectional estimation are clearer 
when we compare results for longer experience. From more than 10 years of experience in 
Spain, assimilation profile is lower in cross-section estimates. In the next section, we provide 
evidence on the fact that this is reflecting the observed increase in the quality of more recent 
migrant’s cohorts. 
The third column of each block presents the same type of regression excluding 
those years of the regularization since we know that for those years experience in Spain is not 
well proxied by the labour experience by the moment of first register in the Social Security. 
For the other years we are more favoured to match both concepts. Results in terms of 
assimilation are similar to those in column 2 and 4. Notice however, that experience abroad, 
as expected, is less valued in Spain than in the previous estimations. 
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Table 2. Wage equation estimations at percentile 50. Dependent variable: logarithm of daily wages* 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Independent variables Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Std. Err Std. Err Std. Err Std. Err Std. Err Std. Err
Total experience 0.107 0.100 0.101 0.084 0.102 0.103
0.003 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.001
Total experience2 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Total experience3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Total experience4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Illiterate -0.711 -0.764 -0.767 -0.716 -0.752 -0.757
0.003 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001
Primary education -0.645 -0.689 -0.690 -0.650 -0.678 -0.681
0.003 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001
Secondary education -0.331 -0.338 -0.336 -0.355 -0.353 -0.352
0.003 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001
Birth Cohort <=1934 -0.014 -0.014 -0.081 -0.079
0.013 0.000 0.012 0.011
Birth Cohort 1935-1944 0.032 0.032 -0.042 -0.041
0.004 0.000 0.004 0.003
Birth Cohort 1945-1954 0.120 0.084 0.083 0.108 0.023 0.022
0.008 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.002 0.002
Birth Cohort 1955-1964 0.123 0.041 0.040 0.113 -0.004 -0.006
0.003 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001
Birth Cohort 1965-1974 0.052 -0.006 -0.007 0.042 -0.024 -0.024
0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001
NAIRU -0.021 -0.021 -0.025 -0.025
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
noUE15 -0.305 -0.395 -0.349 -0.282 -0.406 -0.529
0.022 0.019 0.000 0.023 0.018 0.039
Years since migration 0-2 0.047 0.086 0.103 0.020 0.058 0.073
0.010 0.005 0.000 0.011 0.005 0.008
Years since migration 3-4 0.121 0.127 0.142 0.109 0.104 0.123
0.008 0.006 0.000 0.009 0.006 0.009
Years since migration 5-6 0.167 0.143 0.161 0.141 0.115 0.143
0.011 0.009 0.000 0.012 0.009 0.012
Years since migration 7-8 0.179 0.169 0.178 0.146 0.154 0.164
0.021 0.012 0.000 0.021 0.012 0.014
Years since migration 9-10 0.145 0.192 0.206 0.122 0.197 0.216
0.027 0.015 0.000 0.028 0.015 0.018
Years since migration 10-12 0.091 0.193 0.207 0.058 0.182 0.194
0.051 0.018 0.000 0.052 0.017 0.020
More than 13 Years since migration 0.148 0.201 0.204 0.112 0.183 0.212
0.024 0.022 0.000 0.024 0.021 0.025
Experience Abroad (From 5 to 9 years ) 0.077 0.093 0.057 0.078 0.093 0.067
0.022 0.013 0.000 0.023 0.013 0.016
Experience Abroad (From 10 to 14 years ) 0.075 0.063 0.025 0.072 0.055 0.025
0.022 0.013 0.000 0.022 0.013 0.016
Experience Abroad (From 15 to 19 years ) 0.048 0.009 -0.020 0.041 -0.008 -0.021
0.022 0.014 0.000 0.023 0.013 0.016
More than 25 years of Experience Abroad 0.040 0.004 -0.023 0.036 -0.041 -0.055
0.024 0.015 0.000 0.025 0.014 0.018
Arrival 1983-1985 -0.100 -0.139 -0.220 -0.085
0.040 0.000 0.038 0.053
Arrival 1986-1990 -0.012 -0.041 -0.045 0.095
0.022 0.000 0.020 0.039
Arrival 1991-1995 -0.002 -0.048 -0.025 0.087
0.013 0.000 0.013 0.035
Arrival 1996-2000 0.080 0.046 0.106 0.227
0.013 0.000 0.012 0.036
Arrival 2001-2005 0.058 0.019 0.090 0.208
0.013 0.000 0.012 0.036
constant 8.526 8.763 8.760 8.569 8.758 8.755
0.009 0.004 0.000 0.010 0.004 0.004
R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.126 0.122 0.123
1 and 4. Cross- Section 2005
2 and 5.Longitudinal Regresion 1980-2005
3 and 6. Longitudinal Regresion 1980-2005 without including those migrants whose arrival was during a period of Special Immigrant Legalization
Monthly contribution over total days worked in a 
given month
Annual contribution over total days worked in 
a given year
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In order to plot the initial wage gap between natives and immigrants and the way it closes over time, we 
need to compute the wage level for a particular native and a particular immigrant. It is clear from the 
coefficients of the regression that natives increase their real wages for a given experience and educational 
attainment the later they are born. In a similar fashion, immigrants increase the wage with the cohort of 
entry and with a lower level of experience abroad given a level of total experience. Figure 4 plots the wage 
differential of a native born between 1964 and 1975 and an immigrant who enter Spain between 1995 
and 2000 with less than 5 years of experience abroad. 
 
 Figure 4: Wage Differential between migrants (exp abroad<5 and 
arrival 1996-2000) and natives (borned 1964-1975) 
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The estimation procedure in section 3 assumed that the wage differences between 
immigrants of different entry cohorts could be modelled as differences in terms of wage 
levels instead of assimilation profiles. Figure 5 shows that all cohorts of entry present a similar 
assimilation pattern. This evidence suggests that assimilation is not importantly affected by a 
change in the quality of immigrants cohort of entry or selective emigration. Figure 5 also 
provides an additional robustness check to our results. As we mentioned previously, our 
definition of a migrant in terms of his nationality in 2005 could be misleading if there is a 
significant part of migrants who acquired the Spanish nationality once they spend some years 
in the country, However, as we observe in this figure, given that the assimilation profile is very 
similar in the more recent cohorts, where migrants have not spent enough time in Spain to 
get the nationality, we are quite confident that this potential shortcoming is not affecting our 
main results. Additionally, it should be emphasized that our estimates for the assimilation 
profile are quite imprecise for the older cohorts, since the relevance of immigration in 
Spain was very low, but for the more recent years, where the immigration phenomena has 
taken relevance, we are able to estimate, very precisely, an assimilation process that reduces 
quite rapidly the initial wage gap for migrants between 10 and 15 pp. in the first  5-6 years of 
experience in the Spanish labour market. 
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Figure 5: Assimilation pattern by cohort of entry entry
Relative wage growth of migrants arriving 1986-1990 (borned 1964-1975) 
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Relative wage growth of migrants arriving 1991-1995 (borned 1964-1975) 
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Relative wage growth of migrants arriving 1996-2000 (borned 1964-1975) 
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Relative wage growth of migrants arriving at 2001-2005 (borned 1964-1975) 
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5 Change in the quality of immigrants over the cohort of entry and selective 
emigration 
Previous section has shown that the quality of immigrants has increased in the more recent 
cohorts. The question is whether this change in the quality of immigrants could be attributed 
to either particular observed characteristic of the new entrants (an improvement in the quality 
of those who enter Spain for the first time) or it is can be just attributed to the existence of 
positive selective emigration (those who come back home earlier present a higher quality than 
the average immigrant) or both. This distinction in relevant since, repeated cross sections 
might be a proper alternative to analyze assimilation provided that there is no role of selective 
emigration. 
Immigration in Spain has changed enormously in the recent past and this is reflected 
in our dataset. Table 3 shows the way the composition of total immigration from outside 
the EU-15 has changed in our sample. In the 80’s and the beginning of the 90’s, the relative 
weight of immigrants coming from Africa attained a percentage around 50%. However, over 
time the weight of migrants coming from Latin-America countries and from countries of the 
latter European Enlargement has increased a lot. 
Both Latin-Americans and immigrants coming from the enlargement have some 
particularities that make their migrants more likely to have productivity above the average of 
immigrants from outside the EU-15. Migrants coming from Latin-America countries know 
the Spanish language, something that is very valuable to find jobs and interact with other 
co-workers. On the other hand, migrants coming from the enlargement possess higher 
levels of education relative to other nationalities and although they usually cannot achieve 
a job that requires all the potential skills they have, they face a much smaller wage gap than 
other migrants from alternative countries of origin. Indeed, when we break the educational 
level of immigrants by the year of entry, it is evident that recent migrants present a much 
higher educational level than those who arrived earlier14. 
 
Table 3: Stock of foreign workers in 2005 by year of entry in the Social Security
Enlargement Africa Latinamerican Other
1983-1985 - 40.51% 15.68% 43.81%
1986-1990 3.79% 48.81% 13.97% 33.43%
1991-1995 5.85% 71.50% 7.98% 14.67%
1996-2000 9.41% 59.70% 18.45% 12.44%
2001-2005 20.48% 31.98% 39.27% 8.27%  
In order to analyze whether these figures represent changes in the composition of 
entries or selective emigration we use information from the Municipal Register of Inhabitants 
(Padrón Municipal de Habitantes). For immigrants, regardless their legal situation in Spain, 
the register in the Padron provides access to some basic public services for all migrants, 
                                                                          
14. This is not only an effect of the compositional change of immigration but it also occurs given a particular country 
of origin. 
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in particular, education and public health care. Therefore, it is expected that even illegal 
migrants who enter the country will be soon incorporated in these figures. We show the 
official numbers of entries in Spain broken by nationality in table 4. 
 
Table 4: Inflows of foreigners by year of registration (padrón)
Enlargement Africa Latinamerican Other
1986-1990 6.67% 23.69% 55.77% 13.87%
1991-1995 5.51% 38.89% 43.48% 12.12%
1996-2000 9.51% 33.76% 49.21% 7.52%
2001-2005 24.68% 19.00% 51.57% 4.75%
Average of yearly percentages over the period  
It is evident that, in the beginning of the 90’s, the percentage of immigrants coming 
from African countries increased, while Latin-Americans decreased and the other origin 
countries kept the same numbers. In the second half of the 90’s, Latin-Americans and 
foreigners coming from countries of the Enlargement started increasing its importance. From 
the 2000 onwards the entries of the enlargement take over. This image on the evolution of 
entries resembles the variations on the stock that were observed in table 3. 
Let us analyze now whether migrants exits to other countries might also contribute to 
explain part of the pattern in table 3. It is certainly difficult finding information regarding 
selective emigration. However, we could use the information available since the introduction 
of the obligation to renewal of the register every 2 years to immigrants coming from 
non EU-15 countries and having a non-permanent permit to work in Spain. This renewal 
was made compulsory since the introduction of a Law in November 2003 and thus was first 
executed at the end of 2005. At that moment all non-communitarian migrants who enter 
before the 31st of December had to renew their registers. All potential migrants where 
informed by mail and it was found that around 500.000 did not renew the register15. 
The Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE) provided us the dataset with some 
characteristics of those definite and pending no-renovations in terms of nationality and the 
year of entry. We could attribute definite no-renovations as individuals who emigrated back 
home or to another country, and some pending no-renovations will also fit in that category16. 
For a given year of entry, the comparison of the number of no-renovations and the number 
of entries gives a proxy for an exit rate. This exit rate or emigration rate has only a meaning for 
the entries of 2003, because the initial register for people who change residency among 
provinces is replaced by the last movement. Thus, we infer that for those who enter in 2003 
there is no much time to move to another province. 
Table 5 shows the emigration rates for particular nationalities. This emigration rate is 
around 18%17. It is found that emigration rates do differ for different countries of origin. The 
                                                                          
15. Despite the fact that Municipalities worked hard to find whether individuals left the country or just forgot to renew, 
since part of their public budget depends on the number of residents. In November 2006, around 260.000 were 
definitely lost and 280.000 were still being pending. 
16. As suggested by INE we impute a rate of no renovations of 50% for those registers still pending, but this fact does 
not affect the qualitative results. 
17. In the case that all pending registers were found in Spain the rate would be 9% and it would be 22% if all pending 
registers were found to be lost. 
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higher rate is for immigrants coming from the enlargement (17%). Africans and Asian 
immigrants have very similar emigration rates (16%) and Latin-Americans appear to be the 
group with the lowest emigration rates. Older males in all nationalities appear to be more likely 
to emigrate back home. 
 
Table 5: No renewals of the register in 2005 for those who entered in  2003
Romania and 
Bulgaria Africa America Total
16.06% 18.41%Emigration rate 22.33% 20.57%
 
This evidence would reinforce the idea that better immigrants in terms of education 
are the ones with higher probabilities of exit. Indeed, as it is shown in figure 6, other 
nationalities such as the United States, Chile or Argentina with high educational attainment 
and despite their distance from Spain presenting also higher exit rates. Therefore, this 
evidence suggests that positive selective emigration also contributed to the change in the 
quality of immigrants by cohort of entry, increasing the doubts on using repeated 
cross-sections to analyze this particular question for the Spanish case. 
Figure 6: Exit rates of the main source countries of immigrants in 2003
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6 Mechanisms underlying assimilation 
In the previous sections we showed that the immigrant wage gap reduces with the time 
spent in Spain since the pace of growth of immigrant wages is faster than the one 
corresponding to their native counterparts, and therefore the existing arrival wage gap 
reduces notably after the first seven-eight years in Spain, although not disappearing 
completely. 
The next step should be to understand the mechanisms underlying this wage 
assimilation process. In the introduction we proposed two possible explanations for this 
different wage growth pace. On the one hand, more occupationally mobile and dynamic 
workers should be prone to improve their wages, because they move to those 
places where they are better paid. Notice that immigrants are more mobile than natives 
because they are less attached to a particular region than Spaniards. Other plausible reason 
that may be behind the observed wage convergence could be the conventional human 
capital accumulation once in the destination country. As time goes on, they adapt their 
knowledge and qualifications to the host country and acquire new skills and abilities 
that make them more prone to benefit from their previous skills ore even more productive in 
absolute terms and as a consequence better paid. 
In order to asses whether the catching up to the native born earnings levels could be 
explained as a result of the higher degree of migrants’ mobility, we consider changes in 
the province. Notice that most temporary work permits restrict the movement of province and 
sector during the first years, but once it is renewed, the immigrant might move freely. 
Human capital gains might be reflected in changes outside the initial firm (changing sector 
within the province or changing firm within the province and sector), or within the initial firm. 
In a sense, we are going to take equation (3) and taking first differences we define 
changes in the log wage as in equation (4): 
 
 
                   (4) 
 
Hence, all fixed effects vanish and the wage growth differential between natives and 
immigrants ( )11 ++ − tNtI δδ  will be explained by different propensity to regional mobility 1λ , 
human capital accumulation that exacerbate a change of sector 2λ  or firm 3λ and human 
capital accumulation that yields a payoff within the initial firm 0λ . 
Doing this analysis with our data set requires defining the labour status of the worker 
in a bunch of categories: province, sector of activity and working company. Since it 
provides information about all the “legal” labour relations that the workers have every day, 
it is difficult to assign a single value to every dimension, because they might be working 
simultaneously in two or more jobs with different characteristics. As a strategy we follow the 
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same steps as INE that were mentioned in section 418. By doing this, we get a labour 
sequence of all labour dimensions mentioned before for each individual in the sample and, 
it is possible to compute the probability of changes from one year to other for each specific 
dimension considered. It is also important to remark that we restrict the analysis to only those 
labour relations that are under General Regime. 
Table 6 provides the probit coefficients for the regression of changes in labour status 
from one year to another. This table shows that no UE 15 workers in Spain are more 
occupationally mobile than natives in the three dimensions above mentioned. This higher 
mobility starts being relevant after the first two years, when legal restrictions are overcome 
and decreases over time. 
Table 6: Yearly change of status
Depend Variable
Province Sector Company
noUE-15 0.008 -0.006 -0.021
0.001 0.001 0.002
Years since migration 3-4 0.026 0.055 0.014
0.001 0.002 0.003
Years since migration 5-6 0.011 0.029 0.092
0.001 0.003 0.005
Years since migration 7-8 0.000 0.019 0.063
0.002 0.004 0.006
Years since migration 9-10 0.001 0.023 0.074
0.003 0.005 0.008
Years since migration 10-12 0.002 0.007 0.023
0.003 0.006 0.009
More than 13 Years since migration -0.006 0.004 0.021
0.000 0.006 0.000
Age 0.000 -0.001 0.001
0.000 0.000 0.000
Iliterate 0.003 -0.002 0.016
0.000 0.001 0.001
Primary 0.003 0.002 0.016
0.000 0.001 0.001
Secondary 0.002 -0.003 -0.006
0.000 0.001 0.001
Constant 0.001 0.080 0.111
0.000 0.001 0.001  
 
                                                                          
18. We restrict the period of interest to a specific quarter of the year: we choose the second quarter. It makes easier the 
comparison with other data sources as LFS. Each individual is randomly assigned to a reference week during 
the second quarter of the year (as it happens with the interviews of the LFS). After that, we define her labour situation 
during that quarter depending on what she is doing during her reference week. If the individual has more than 
one job during the reference week, we choose among all of them the permanent one. If several are permanent (or all are 
temporal), we choose the longer during the month corresponding to the reference week in the quarter. If several 
are permanent (or all are temporal) and have the same length during the month, we choose the one that begins earlier. 
If still those conditions are the same, we choose the one that finishes later. We repeat the process for all the working 
years. 
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To inspect the influence of the labour choices – changes in province, sector, firm and 
type of contract within the company – on the increase of wages, we will perform OLS 
regression of the increase in the logarithm of wages of the non top coded observations. 
Results are shown in Table 7. The first column identifies that immigrants from outside the EU-
15 experienced a wage growth that is 1.8 pp higher than comparable natives. The coefficient 
in front of the variable years since migration identifies the fact that this differential higher wage 
growth for immigrants vanishes over time and eventually disappears in 9 years. This result is 
consistent with what was obtained in section 5. Column 2 controls for interprovincial 
movements. Controlling for those movements, only explains 2 pp of the differential wage 
growth since the coefficient in front of the immigrant dummy decreases from 1.8 to 1.6 pp.. 
This means that the different inter-regional mobility of migrants and natives is only responsible 
of 11% of the assimilation profile. Consequently, almost 90% of the differential wage growth 
should be found within the same province either by changes across sectors, firms or within 
the same company19. 
Table 7: Ols regressions of the yearly log wage change of non top coded individuals
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
noUE15 0.018 0.016 0.012 0.009
(0,003) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003)
Years since migration -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Total experience -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.022
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Total experience2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Total experience3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(5.49e-07) (5.49e-07) (5.49e-07) (5.49e-07)
Change in province 0.036 0.039 0.042
(0,002) (0,002) (0,002)
Change sector within province 0.058 0.061
(0,001) (0,001)
Change firm within sector and province 0.037
(0,001)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.129 0.129 0.125 0.123
(0,006) (0,006) (0,006) (0,006)  
 
Finally, in column 4, all those abovementioned changes are controlled and 
we conclude that 50% of the differential wage growth occurs within the firm. Wrapping up the 
abovementioned numbers, higher mobility of migrants across regions is responsible for 10% 
of the wage growth differential, changes in sector and corporations within the same province 
are responsible for 40% of the wage growth differential, and the rest is attributed to a better 
behaviour of immigrants respect to natives within the same initial firm. We interpret this result 
as evidence that most of the assimilation of immigrants comes from human capital gains 
that materialize in similar proportions by an improvement in his labour situation within the 
initial firm or by moving out from low-paid sectors and corporations to better ones. 
                                                                          
19. It is also possible that migrants were more mobile across municipalities than natives, but this is an issue 
that we cannot test with this dataset. 
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7 Conclusions 
In this paper we have analyzed earnings assimilation of immigrants in Spain using longitudinal 
data. Immigration in Spain has become a matter of very high relevance in the recent years 
since the percentage of immigrants in the Spanish population increased from 2% in 2000 
to 11% six years later. We used a novel dataset of labour market histories to analyze how 
relative earnings of male immigrants to Spain evolve over time with respect to Spanish born 
workers. We show that the initial wage differential with respect to natives with the same 
observable characteristics decreases with time spent in Spain. According to our estimates, 
assimilation of legal immigrants is pretty rapid, with a reduction of around the half of the initial 
wage gap during the first 5-6 years. However, we do not observe that the wage gap vanishes 
completely. Overall, these results are quite robust to different data assumptions and, in 
particular, the assimilation process we estimate is quite similar across different immigrant’s 
entry cohorts. 
The approach on this paper is a step forward respect to previous studies of earnings 
assimilation using single or repeated cross sections because it takes into account the fact 
that in Spain an important change in the quality of immigrants has taken place. Previous 
studies had underestimated earnings assimilation by not taking into consideration the 
selection of inflows or outflows. Indeed, the paper shows that Spain has changed 
the composition of immigrants in terms of their country of origin. In recent years, the relative 
weight of Latin-Americans and immigrants from the European Enlargement had grown 
notably respect to Africans. As a consequence, the initial wage gap of the average immigrant 
has decreased. Moreover, the paper shows that there is some positive selective emigration: 
countries such as the United States, Argentina, Bulgaria or Romania that have high 
educational attainment respect to the average immigrant present high exit rates. Both 
phenomena invalidate using single or repeated cross sections to analyze earnings assimilation 
in Spain. 
There are two hypotheses behind the positive wage growth differential between 
migrants and natives. On the one hand, the initial low level of human capital, at least that part 
which is more useful in the destination country, compared to the level faced by comparable 
natives, justifies a high incentive to invest in human capital upon arrival. On the other, in a 
regulated labour market such as the Spanish, there are many institutions that exacerbate 
economic differences across regions or municipalities. Migrants are more prone to benefit 
from those differences since they have lower social attachments than natives. In order to 
separate out those two mechanisms we analyze how the wage growth differs between 
migrants and Spaniards, first unconditionally, and second controlling for movements 
across provinces. It appears that movements across regions might only explain 11% of the 
wage growth differential between migrants and non-migrants. Consequently, most of 
the assimilation should be attributed to human capital gains. Moreover, human capital gains 
are mostly materialized within the initial firm instead of being the results of between firm’s 
mobility, either with changes across sectors or companies. 
 To conclude, our results could be indicating a positive contribution of immigration to 
the evolution of productivity in the Spanish economy over the coming years. Large 
immigration flows received in the recent past has, at least partly [see Banco de España (2006) 
and Lacuesta et al. (2008)], contributed to poor productivity performance. Our paper has 
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shown that the initial wage, or productivity, gap between natives and immigrants rapidly 
decreases as immigrants acquire country-specific human capital. Hence, in the near future, 
while lower immigrant flows are expected20, the assimilation profile of those migrants already 
in the Spanish labour market will tend to positively contribute to productivity growth. In any 
case, we should also recognize that much uncertainty remains about the behaviour of 
immigrants in the Spanish labour market since the immigration phenomena has taken place in 
a especially positive economic environment. 
                                                                          
20. According to the last population projections made by INE, immigration flows will decrease in the coming years to 
around one half of those observed in the more recent past. 
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